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) 
[L. A. No. 25107. In Bank. Feb. 2, 1959.] 
LEO D. RAPP, Appellant, v. VERA K. GIBSON et a1., 
Respondents. 
[1] Public Officers - Compensation - Increasing Compensation.-
Under Gov. Code, § 53071, suspending the constitutional pro-
vision prohibiting increase of an officer's compensation after 
his election or during his term of office (Const., art. XI, § 5) 
during "time of war" and Gov. Code, § 53070, defining "war" 
as that period of time when Congress declares war, or when 
the armed forces of the United States are engaged in active 
military operations against a foreign power, whether or not 
war has been formally declared, and ending one year after 
termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the Presi-
dent, the presidential proclamations of Jan. 7,1955, declaring 
the termination of Korean hostilities and designating Jan. 31, 
1955, as the date of termination of combatant activities in the 
Korean conflict fulfilled the requirements of the foregoing 
constitutional and statutory provisions, though the immediate 
purpose was to terminate certain veteran benefits, the suspen-
sion of the provision prohibiting salary increases terminated 
on Jan. 7, 1956, one year after the presidential declaration of 
termination of hostilities, and a county salary ordinance of 
December 31, 1957, increasing the compensation of incumbent 
elective officers of the county did not become dfective until 
after their terms expired on January 5, 1959. 
[1] See Cal.J'ur.2d, Public Officers, § 174. 
Kelt. Dig. Reference: [1] Public OffiCf'TS, § 110(1). 
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APPEAL from a judgment. of the Superior Court of Kern I 
County. Robert. B. Lambert, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for declaratory relief to determine effective date 
of a county salary ordinance increasing compensation of 
incumbent elective officers of county. Judgment for defend-
ants reversed. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff, the auditor of Kern County, 
brought this action for declaratory relief against all of the 
incumbent elective officers of that county' to determine the 
effective date of a salary ordinance adopted by the Board of 
Supervisors of Kern County on December 31,1957, increasing 
the compensation of these officers. The officers contend that 
the increase became effective on February I, 1958, as provided 
in the ordinance. The auditor contends that the California 
Constitution prevents the salary ordinance from becoming 
) 
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effective until after defendants' terms of office expire on 
January 5, 1959.1 
The Constitution provides that ., the compensation of any 
county, to,vnship or municipal officer shall not be increased 
after his election or during his term of office, ... " (art. XI, 
§ 5.) This section was amended in 1944 to permit the Legis-
lature to suspend the provision "for any period during which 
the United States is eugaged in war and for one year after 
the termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the 
President of the United States." Pursuant to this amendment, 
the Legislature suspended the provision during ., time of war" 
(Gov. Code, § 53071). "War" is defined in section 53070 
of the Government Code as "that period of time commencing: 
(a) When Congress declares war; or (b) When the armed 
forces of the United States are engaged in active military oper-
ations against any foreign power whether or not after war 
has been formally declared; . . . and ending one year after 
the termination of hostilities therein as proclaimed by the 
President of the United States." 
The trial court found that beginning in 1950 the armed 
forces of the United States were engaged in active military 
operations in Korea that constituted ., hostilities" and a 
"war" within the meaning of section 53070, subd. (b); that 
no proclamation has been issued by the President specifically 
terminating these hostilities; and that under section 53071, 
the constitutional prohibition against salary increases is still 
suspended. The court therefore held that the salary increases 
were effective February 1, 1958. Plaintiff contends that the 
termination of hostilities in the Korean conflict has been pro-
claimed by the President and that therefore the salary in-
creases cannot become effective before January 5, 1959, the 
('xpiration date of the terms of office during which the salary 
ordinance was adopted. We agree with this contention. 
[1] On January 7, 1955, a presidential proclamation :fix-
ing the terminal date of eligibility for certain Korean veteran 
benefits declared that: "Whereas the armistice between the 
United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Korean 
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the 
other hand, effective July 27, 1953, has termh~ated hostilities 
in said conflict .... " (Pres. Proc. No. 3080, 3 C.F.R. 17.) 
''I'hl' of(linan~e Ilro\'idcs that if the provisions of law prohibit the 
~,.lary increases from hecoming effectivc on February 1, 19G8, they should 
hecome effertive on January 5, 1959, the date of the expiration of de· 
fenuRnts' terms of office. 
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On the same date the President issued Executive Order No. 
]0585, relating to income tax exemptions of the armed forces, 
ill which he declared that "January 31,1955, is designated llS 
the date of termination of combatant activities" in the Korean 
conflict. The fact that the immediate purpose of these decla-
. rations was to terminate certain veteran benefits does not make 
. them any the less official public proclamations by the Presi-
.dent. of the termination of the Korean hostilities. The 
President could hardly be expected to make sueh declarations, 
unrelated to some specific purpose simply to declare the termi-
nation of a formally undeclared war. (See Pye, The Legal 
Status of the Korean Hostilities, 45 Geo. L. J. 45, 58-59; 27 
Atty. Gen. Op. 295.) The United States Court of Military 
Appeals, relying on the foregoing presidential declarations, I 
has held that for purposes of the military code the hostilities 
in the Korean conflict were at an end brfore June 4, 1955:, 
" [T]aking into consideration all the circumstances existing! 
on June 4, 1955, the date the offense in this case was com-
mitted, the inescapable conclusion is that a 'time of war' 
condition has ended." (United States v. Sa1Idm'S, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 
21, 21 C.M.R. 147, 148.) 
Since the presidential declarations of January 7, 1955, 
fulfilled the requirements of article XI, section 5 of the 
Constitution and sections 53070-53071 of the Government 
Code, the suspension of the provision prohibiting salary in-
creases terminated on January 7, 1956, one year after the 
presidential declaration of termination of hostilities. It fol-
lows that the salary ordinance of December 31, 1957, did not 
become effective until after defendants' terms of office expired 
on January 5,1959. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb, J., concurred. 
